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Abstract
We describe a preliminary set of security requirements for safe and secure next-generation 
medical systems, consisting of dynamically composable units, tied together through a real-time 
safety-critical middleware. We note that this requirement set is not the same for individual (stand-
alone) devices or for electronic health record systems, and we must take care to define system-
level requirements rather than security goals for components. The requirements themselves build 
on each other such that it is difficult or impossible to eliminate any one of the requirements and 
still achieve high-level security goals.
1 Introduction
This position paper is a first step in deriving and elucidating security properties needed for 
safe operation of next-generation medical systems – sets of medical devices and health 
information systems, dynamically composable as needed. and enabled by medical 
application platforms. MAPs are safety- and security-critical real-time open computing 
platforms for (a) integrating heterogeneous devices, medical information systems, and 
information displays via a communication infrastructure and (b) hosting application 
programs (clinical logic and/or workflow automation) that provide medical utility via the 
ability to both acquire information from, and update/control integrated devices, IT systems, 
and displays [1]. A MAP can be implemented in a number of ways and environments such 
as clinical, home-based, mobile, or distributed.
While security alone cannot guarantee safety, it is unlikely that we will be able to achieve 
safety without security. Current safety evaluation and verification and validations techniques 
are designed primarily to deal with environmental failures and stand-alone devices or 
collections of devices that are integrated by a single manufacturer. For medical systems that 
do include some form of limited dynamic integration and reconfigurability of components 
such as central station monitors, current safety approaches often dictate that each 
combination of components requires evaluation as a complete system. This implies that for a 
system with interchangeable constituents, the manufacturer must gain regulatory approval 
for every possible permutation of constituent devices forming the composite medical system 
(which has been termed “pair-wise” approval).1 For example, if a new type of medical 
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device is added to the central station monitoring system, then the entire system must be 
reevaluated. Security is rarely taken into account, dismissed with blanket statements of 
precautions such as usage of antivirus software on desktops and intrusion detection/
prevention in networks. Note that we are referring to the security of medical platforms as a 
whole rather than individual devices. Device security is vital [3, 4], but does not capture the 
all security requirements for a system of interoperating devices.
Experience in consumer electronics with interoperability standards such as USB, WiFi, etc. 
has shown the success of the “component-wise” certification approach: manufacturers 
submit their products to third-party certification organizations that verify that the products 
conform to interfacing and communication standards. These components are then integrated 
into larger systems/-configurations with high degrees of confidence and without the need to 
verify each possible combination of components. Of course, the challenges in the area of 
safety/security-critical medical systems are much greater. However, in the critical systems 
space, Integrated Modular Avionics [5] and the MILS Security architecture [6] are examples 
where standards-based architectures and interfaces are being used to encourage the 
development of a commodity market of safety-critical components, taking security into 
account explicitly. We believe that lessons learned in these frameworks can help in 
constructing standards that will allow medical systems to be verified and receive safety 
evaluations in a component-wise, as opposed to a pair-wise, fashion.
2 Unique Security Challenges
Medical systems are a unique instance of cyber-physical systems (CPS). They often require 
real-time guarantees which are more strict than other CPSes such as the smart grid. 
Avionics, power plant control systems, and other industries with federal safety regulations 
come to mind as the closest analogs, but these systems are closed to the outside and 
physically protected from tampering. Hospitals and other care facilities, on the other hand, 
rarely incorporate physical access control except for controlled substances, and individual 
devices are almost never tamper-resistant. Several additional quirks make medical 
applications unique within the CPS realm. One is the regulatory requirement for emergency 
override – human caregivers must be able to disable safeguards that are designed to ensure 
safety and security but may, in an emergency, inhibit delivery of needed care. Medical 
systems themselves are assumed to be unreliable in determining when such an emergency is 
taking place. Therefore, security controls must be subject to disabling – termed “break-
glass,” [7] such as when pulling a fire alarm breaks a glass rod before activating. Security is 
especially challenging to implement when it can be disabled. Further, while we cannot rely 
on authentication during emergencies – it may slow down emergency response – we must 
maintain (in fact, increase) accountability and logging to ensure that post-hoc event 
reconstruction and auditing is possible.
3 Minimal Requirements
We suggest a list of security properties (for component-wise evaluated systems) that must be 
enforced in order to ensure:
– no harm can come to the patient through deliberate tampering with data;
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– confidential patient data is not obtained by unauthorized parties;
– regulatory authorities and medical system operators can be confident that only 
components that are authorized for use are incorporated; and
– in case of an adverse incident, authorities have sufficient information available 
to support audits to determine the root cause(s) of the incident.
These properties are inspired by, and partially draw from, Anderson’s model of clinical 
information systems [8], but encompass individual composable devices as well as 
middleware/support system architecture rather than focusing on databases of patient health 
records or individual devices.
1. Integrity to prevent unauthorized alteration of data or code2 in transit3 or at rest, 
and prevent unauthorized physical modification.
2. Authenticity for trustworthy identification of principals.
3. Authorization to codify the actions that an entity is allowed to perform.
4. Attribution to allow unambiguous identification of proximal causes of events or 
sources of data.
5. Provenance to record the original source and chain of possession of data (i.e., 
series of attributions). This should be securely and reliably logged.
6. Availability to guarantee that the system is reliable for predefined (possibly very 
small) periods of time.
7. Timeliness and transparency of system availability state, i.e., messages are 
delivered in a timely fashion4 or not at all, and exposure to the components of the 
status of the system – whether or not it is currently available/reliable.
8. Confidentiality to ensure data is not readable by anyone who does not have the 
correct cryptographic credentials.
9. Privacy, which is broader than confidentiality, and is meant to partially control 
information leakage and inference.
Figure 1 shows property dependencies, but they may differ depending on the point of view. 
Moving from the bottom up, provenance (and secure logging of data and metadata) 
achieves accountability of original source as well as intermediate entities, providing full 
traceability of data custody and alteration. This can only be achieved by systems providing 
attribution of data to its previous custodian. Attribution in turn relies on the authenticity 
and integrity of the data and the device that authored it. Note that authorization, while 
requiring authenticity and integrity, is somewhat orthogonal, since actions may be allowed 
under certain circumstances without prior authorization (such as break-glass), as long as 
they are logged and can later be audited and their provenance traced. Confidentiality and 
privacy are likewise orthogonal, since in most cases they are not required for safe operation 
2Code can include “virtual” software-only “devices”.
3Data left its producer but has not yet arrived at the final consumer (destination).
4As defined by the receiving component
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(although they are required by law in some jurisdictions to protect private health information 
[9, 10]). Availability and timeliness of events are both required, but not to the same extent 
in all systems. Not all medical interactions require full real-time guarantees and continuous 
connectivity, but these properties must be taken into account: availability because the 
system must be functional at least part of the time, even if only long-enough for initial 
programming and a “start” command, and timeliness or temporal ordering awareness 
because in cases where real-time control is needed, we must reliably notify communicating 
components when that property has been lost, so they can engage their fallback failsafe 
states. Certainly temporal ordering is also required for logging, in order to allow for accurate 
forensic reconstruction of events [11, 12].
4 Conclusion
The properties enumerated above are required for effective component-wise clearance, and 
eliminating each one presents a problem for technical operation, regulatory approval, or 
both. Some properties build upon others, and their requirements can be traced to the 
desirability of the “top-level” property. For instance, if we want provenance information as 
part of a log, we must also have attribution, which requires authenticity and integrity.
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Requirement interdependencies. Children depend on parents.
Vasserman and Hatcliff Page 6
Inform Secur Appl (2013). Author manuscript; available in PMC 2015 January 15.
N
IH
-P
A
 A
uthor M
anuscript
N
IH
-P
A
 A
uthor M
anuscript
N
IH
-P
A
 A
uthor M
anuscript
